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AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: 
TO FIND TRUTH AND FACILITATE CHANGE 
 
Skip Grieser, M.Ed. 
Subsystem Technologies 
Denver, Colorado, USA 
 
The Federal Aviation Administration’s Air Traffic Organization Office of Safety 
sponsors a comprehensive and ongoing program of Crew Resource Management 
(CRM), Human Factors in Air Traffic Control (ATC).  CRM begins with a one-
day workshop for all field ATC personnel, including management, staff, 
supervisors, and air traffic controllers.  Facilitators present principles and methods 
in teamwork, individual performance, and Threat and Error Management, and 
participants discuss and record how they can use those principles and methods in 
their air traffic operations and safety cultures.  Participants identify local safety 
issues and record their own recommendations, which then are compiled from all 
the workshops in each facility, and the data is delivered to local management for 
follow-up action.  This is proactive data, intended to improve individual, team, 
and system performance before errors and accidents occur.  To avoid the 
regression effect, reinforcement includes recurrent training, team debriefs, 




In Megatrends (1982), John Naisbitt described one major trend as “High Tech, High 
Touch.”  Along with improvements in technology and technical standards, people in all fields are 
searching for ways to address the needs and potentials of their workers, and to improve human 
performance. 
 
Most every field has its technical side and its human side.  On the technical side in 
aviation, we have better aircraft design, construction, and maintenance.  We have better weather 
detection and avoidance equipment, and we have better navigation and ATC equipment. 
 
After these safety gains in technology, human and system factors now cause or contribute 
to up to 80 percent of all aviation accidents, and almost all air traffic controller operational errors 
(losses of required separation), which jeopardize safety.  Human factors, and system factors 




 In 1979, after several fatal airline accidents were caused or contributed to by breakdowns 
in human and system factors, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
sponsored a conference, Resource Management on the Flightdeck.  In 1981, United Airlines was 
the first airline to start CRM training, and the International Civil Aviation Organization now 
requires all of the world’s commercial airlines to deliver CRM training to flight crews. 
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In 1985, the Seattle Air Route Traffic Control Center developed Controller Awareness 
and Resource Training, an excellent three-day workshop with fourteen major subjects.  Known 
as CART, it was the first well-known grassroots ATC human factors course.  In 1992, with 
CART as the forerunner, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the National Air Traffic 
Controllers’ Association (NATCA), and consultants from Human Technology, Inc. developed 
Air Traffic Teamwork Enhancement (ATTE), the FAA’s first national ATC human factors 
course. 
 
ATTE was a three-day workshop that was delivered, over ten years, to only an estimated 
one-third of the FAA’s ATC workforce.  Budget and staffing restrictions were obstacles to more 
complete delivery and, even more so, to recurrent training. 
 
In 1997, the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences published 
Flight to the Future: Human Factors in Air Traffic Control, in which a panel of human factors 
experts raised seven concerns about ATTE.  Two of the concerns were that “the program does 
not demonstrate organizational commitment to the concepts by being budgeted and mandated at 
the national level and integrated into ongoing training and evaluation activities,” and that “the 
training is designed as a single-event program without provision for annual recurrent training.”  
The panel recommended that the FAA “initiate a systematic effort to reinforce the value of 
teamwork within its organizational culture,” and require an “improved … centrally funded 
program” which provides “recurrent training, hands-on practice, and reinforcement” at all air 
traffic facilities.  
 
In 1999, Denver controllers and supervisors – following these recommendations in 
another grassroots effort – developed ATC CRM.  These one-day CRM workshops were 
delivered to Colorado facilities in 2000, and then CRM grew to a regional program when 
workshops were delivered to Seattle and Salt Lake City air traffic facilities in 2002 and 2003.  In 
2004, the FAA Air Traffic Organization’s Office of Safety – when it was looking for a one-day 
human factors workshop that was more deliverable than the three-day ATTE course – discovered 
the Denver program, and began sponsoring it nationally in 2005. 
 
The CRM program described in this paper is an evolution of the Denver program that has 
been field-tested, revised, and refined many times.  The shorter length of the CRM workshop is 
only one difference from ATTE.  The CRM workshop’s content is more ATC-oriented, and more 
specific to each facility’s own operations and culture.  It generates more active engagement of 
participants in determining how they can use the principles and methods in their own operations 
and culture.  Importantly, proactive data is identified by the workforce on local safety issues, and 
their recorded recommendations are used for taking follow-up action.  Finally, there are 
systematic, ongoing reinforcements designed to avoid the regression effect that commonly 
follows one-time, “flavor of the month” training events.  The training field calls one-time events 







CRM Workshop Content 
 
 CRM, as defined in the workshops, is the intentional use of effective human factors 
principles and methods to improve team, individual, and system performance, and to reduce 
errors and accidents.  As it is in airline CRM, Threat and Error Management (TEM) is the 
cornerstone of ATC CRM, and one of the three major subjects in the workshop.  And because 
controllers – like members of flight crews, surgical teams, bands, orchestras, and sports teams – 
operate simultaneously as individuals and as members of a team, teamwork and individual 




 Teamwork is the first of the major subjects in the workshop, so that defense mechanisms 
are a little more relaxed among wary participants, who may come in wondering whether they are 
there to be “fixed” – in terms of their individual performance and their actual or potential errors.  
It’s easier for them to first talk about their team.  By the time they have done that, and they have 
seen the non-threatening approach and format of the workshop, then they are ready to consider 
their individual performance, and threat and error management.  The teamwork lesson is divided 
into four main subtopics, as follows. 
 
CRM Behaviors in an Operational Safety Culture 
 
 Six CRM behaviors, adapted from Dr. Robert Helmreich and the University of Texas 
Human Factors Research Project, are presented.  The behaviors are: 1) provide active operational 
leadership and support, 2) effectively distribute workload and tasks, 3) clearly communicate all 
operational plans to everyone, 4) make “safety-first” decisions and review them to reinforce 
safety, 5) brief and plan for known safety risks and threats, and 6) maintain safety culture 
vigilance, speak up, and listen. 
 
 Using definitions of these six behaviors, small groups discuss and record what they 
already do in these areas – good and not so well – and what they start doing, or could do better.  




 Productive organizational change is discussed in terms of supporters, fence-sitters, and 
resisters.  Working for change in areas where you already have influence, or can start having 
influence, is discussed.  The point is made that any group, facility, or team is going to be exactly 




 In small group discussions, participants identify “best practice feeds” for delivering a 
good product to the next controller, in their own local operations.  Again, small group reports to 





 The value of having teams debrief after operational ATC sessions is discussed, and 
debriefs are encouraged to support and reinforce the use of CRM behaviors and best practices.  
Teams that debrief routinely communicate better, understand each other’s expectations, and do 
improve individual and team performance. 
 
Improving Individual Performance 
 
 Because controllers operate simultaneously as individuals and as members of a team, 
improving individual performance is also addressed.  A central focus of this lesson is that 
everyone, at any level, can perform better if they learn from experts, who develop higher abilities 
in two critical skills: their abilities to maintain situational awareness and to develop, revise, and 
execute their plan.  Situational awareness and executing the plan are discussed after two 
supporting tools are presented – a formula for consistency, and a formula for improving 
commitment, confidence, and control.  The lesson concludes with a formula to remove the 
ambiguities in the goal conflict between protection and production, or, in ATC terms,  between 




 Former football coach George Allen said, “Consistency is the truest measure of success.  
It requires concentration, determination, and repetition.”  A group puzzle, solved by the whole 
class as a fill-in-the-blank guessing game, reveals “the secret to ATC” consistency – “Do the 
right thing, with every aircraft, at the right time, every time, no matter how many aircraft you 
have.  And if you need help to do that, call for it in time.” 
 
Commitment, Confidence, and Control 
 
 Dr. Robert Kriegel and Dr. Marilyn Harris Kriegel developed The C Zone to improve 
peak performance under pressure.  Attitude is critical, because it leads to commitment, 
confidence, and control.  Raising any one of these will automatically raise the other two, and 
methods to raise each are presented.  Control can be raised by using “CAN-DOs” – specific 
actions that will help, can be done now, and are in your control.  Managing both overloads and 
underloads are discussed as significant human factors challenges, and workshop participants 
explore using C Zone methods to maintain a reasonably comfortable balance between challenge 
and mastery. 
 
Maintain Situational Awareness 
 
 Dr. Mica Endsley identified the three major components of situational awareness as 
perception (what we see and hear), comprehension (what we understand), and projection (what 
we plan to do).  Expert controllers develop higher abilities to maintain situational awareness.  
Individual and team CAN-Dos – to maintain situational awareness and to raise it back up when it 




Develop, Revise, and Execute the Plan 
 
 For any ATC position, in any tower cab or radar room, with any type of air traffic volume 
and complexity, in any weather or airport configuration, expert controllers develop higher 
abilities to develop, revise, and execute their plan.  By focusing on this skill, along with 
situational awareness, anyone at any level can learn from the experts’ examples and get better.  
Novices can become intermediates sooner, intermediates can become experts, and experts can be 
more consistent.  Participants explore developing, revising, and executing the plan in small group 
discussions that identify and record best practices for working their own positions. 
 
Best practice feeds (from the teamwork lesson) are about “what’s good for the next 
controller.”  Best practices for working your own position are about “what’s good for you.”  
Again, small group discussions are followed by reports to the large group, with discussions and 
sharing of ideas. 
 
Protection versus Production     
 
 Dr. James Reason has maintained that people in hazardous technologies, where people’s 
lives are at stake, must effectively manage the inherent goal conflicts between protection and 
production.  It is inarguable that people have sometimes died when production has been valued 
over protection.  In ATC, “protection means safety” and “production means capacity.” 
 
 NASA Ames Chief Scientist for Human Factors, Dr. R. Key Dismukes, maintains that 
the protection versus production goal conflict creates ambiguities in people’s minds, especially 
when under pressure.  The resolution is to “disambiguate” that goal conflict.  It is not a matter of 
keeping the goals in balance, which leads toward ambiguity.  It’s a matter of prioritizing them, 
keeping safety first, always.  Although capacity remains a goal, it is a secondary goal.  “Every 
thing you do to enhance capacity must be safe, or you wouldn’t do that thing.” 
 
Threat and Error Management 
 
 Keeping safety first provides a bridge to the cornerstone and “grand finale” of the 
workshop, Threat and Error Management (TEM).  A model is explored in which workshop 
participants systematically identify the unsafe acts of individuals and teams, and the local 
workplace factors that sometimes put them in error-prone conditions. 
 
The Risk Denial Syndrome 
 
 Adapted from Dr. Robert Besco, the “risk denial syndrome” makes us vulnerable to error 
when we circumvent standard procedures and make risky decisions, while thinking that we’re 
gaining an operational advantage, achieving worthy goals, and that “it won’t matter.”  The 
resolution is to catch ourselves thinking, “it won’t matter,” and then “do the right thing, with 





Internal Risks and External Threats 
 
 Internal risks are within the facility.  They include quick turnaround schedules, outdated 
airspace and procedures, and control room distractions.  External threats are from outside the 
facility, and include weather, airline schedules, and problems with adjacent facilities.  In a large 
group brainstorming session, these are explored in terms of identifying local vulnerabilities, 
ways to eliminate them, and how to countermeasure those that are not, or cannot be, eliminated. 
 
CRM Error Types 
 
 Exploring specific local error types is another segment adapted from Dr. Robert 
Helmreich and the University of Texas Human Factors Research Project.  Again, in small 
groups, workshop participants identify, discuss, and record actual and potential errors from their 
own operations of five types:  procedural, intentional noncompliance, communications, 
proficiency, and decision-making.  For each actual or potential error, participants identify and 
record ways to prevent them, and to catch and correct them if they still occur.  Again, small 
group reports to the large group generate further discussions and sharing of ideas.   
  
Conclusion:  Find Truth, Facilitate Change 
 
 “Find Truth, Facilitate Change” is a slogan adopted from Hank Krakowski, the FAA Air 
Traffic Organization’s Chief Operating Officer.  The overarching goal of CRM is to promote 
open and honest dialogues and processes that will empower individuals and teams to take 
ownership of their local safety cultures, identify local issues and solutions, and take local actions 
to improve them. 
 
There is a wide range of CRM success stories about resolved safety and separation issues, 
operational and workload issues, and systems and process issues.  They include airspace and 
procedure revisions, the use of best practices and more regular team debriefs of operational 
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